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COMMENT 
SYMPTOMS FOR 
SCALIA AND TEXAS: 
GAY RIGHTS AND 
AMERICAN NATIONALISM 
DANIEL GoRDON* 
INTRODUCTION: MATTI BUNZL'S FAITH IN AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND LAWRENCE 
Matti Bunzl in Symptoms of Modernity: Jews and Queers 
in Late-Twentieth Century Vienna expressed great faith in the 
multicultural fairness of American Society.' Bunzl recognized 
the threat of Christian Conservatives in the United States to 
gay and lesbian civil rights and civil liberties,2 and he evi-
denced some skepticism of American multiculturalism.3 How-
ever, overall Bunzl remained optimistic about the future of civil 
rights for gays and lesbians in the United States noting "it was 
in the United States that a postmodern sensibility of minority 
politics was pioneered.''' Bunzl's basic optimism concerning the 
fuller integration of gay and lesbian rights in the United States 
• Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; B.A., Harverford Col-
lege; J.D. Boston College. I would like to dedicate this article to my wife Robin L. 
Gordon on our thirtieth wedding anniversary. 
'MA'ITI BUNZL, SYMPI'OMS OF MODERNITY: JEWS AND QUEERS IN LATE-
TwENTIETH CENTURY VIENNA (2004). 
2 [d. at 223. 
• Id. at 219. 
• Id. at 218. 
111 
1
Gordon: Scalia and Texas
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2005
112 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
legal system derived from his view of the United States Consti-
tution creating a cultural basis for equality and fairness for all 
in the United States including gays and lesbians.s Bunzl noted, 
"In the United States, a basic pluralism is enshrined in the 
country's constitutional principles."· For Bunzl, the United 
States Constitution served as the reason why most American 
lesbian and gay activists remained convinced that the gay and 
lesbian civil rights movement would succeed in the United 
States.' 
Bunzl's optimism about the United States was partially 
realized in Lawrence v. Texas, (hereinafter, Lawrence) in which 
the United States Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute 
that criminalized gay sodomy.s Certainly, Lawrence evidenced 
the protective powers of the United States Constitution for 
gays and lesbians in the United States. However, Lawrence 
also reflected negative aspects of American culture and consti-
tutionalism in the contexts of gays and lesbians. Not only did 
the majority and concurring opinions in Lawrence hint that 
federal constitutional protection will not be extended to the 
right of gays and lesbians to marry/ but Justice Scalia's dis-
senti. mirrored the deep negativism directed toward gays and 
lesbians by the Texas Court of Appeals in Lawrence. I1 Law-
rence equally supported Bunzl's nagging doubts about whether 
American multiculturalism will include gays and lesbians.'2 
After all, Lawrence ended a criminal ban on gay and lesbian 
sexuality in a major American state more than thirty years 
after the end of such a ban in one of Europe's most socially re-
gressive states, Austria. '3 
5 [d. at 218-19. 
• [d. at 219. 
7 [d. at 223. 
8 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
9 The majority noted, "It does not involve whether the government must give 
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter." [d. The 
concurrence noted, "Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as ... 
preserving the traditional institution of marriage. Unlike the moral disapproval of 
same sex relations ... other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage be-
yond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group." [d. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). 
10 [d. at 586-605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
11 Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W. 3d 349 (Tex App. 2001) rev'd, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
12 BUNZL, supra note 1, at 219. 
13 [d. at 64 (in 1971 Austria's parliament abolished the statute criminalizing 
same-sex sexuality); 539 U.S. at 578. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol35/iss2/1
2005] SCALIA AND TEXAS 113 
This article utilizes Bunzl's work along with the work of 
urban religion sociologists to examine the symbolic meaning of 
Justice Scalia's and the Texas Appellate Court's negativism 
toward gays and lesbians." For Justice Scalia and the Texas 
legal system, gays and lesbians served as symptoms of moder-
nity and modern urban growth. 15 First, this article reviews 
Lawrence in its state and federal contexts. 16 Then, the article 
develops Bunzl's basic theory about gays and lesbians serving 
as "abject symptoms of the modern nation-state. m7 Next, the 
article reviews the patrimonial aspects of urban growth. IS 
Then, the article analyzes Justice Scalia's dissent and the 
Texas Court of Appeal's opinion in Lawrence in the light of 
Bunzl's anthropological construct and religious sociology's ur-
ban growth theory. I. Finally, the article closes looking towards 
a brighter future where through globalization gays and lesbi-
ans may find themselves as members and not abject others in 
American society. 20 
I. LA WRENCE: STATE CASE, SUPREME COURT MAJORITY OPIN-
ION, CONCURRENCE, AND SCALIA'S DISSENT 
Harris County Police Department officers entered a Hous-
ton, Texas area apartment in response to a reported weapons 
disturbance.21 The officers observed John Lawrence engaging 
in a sexual act with another man,22 which constituted in Texas 
a Class C misdemeanor involving deviate sexual intercourse!3 
The police arrested both men, charging them with engaging in 
deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same 
sex." The Texas statute provided that deviate sexual inter-
course with another individual of the same sex occurred where 
there exists "any contact between any part of the genitals of 
14 See infra notes 99-163 and accompanying text. 
I' See infra notes 164-209 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 22-98 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 99-141 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 142-163 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 164-209 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 210-224 and accompanying text. 
21 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
22 [d. at 562-63. 
23 Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W. 3d 349, 350 (Tex. App. 2001) rev'd, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
24 539 U.S. at 563. 
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one person and the mouth or anus of another person, or ... the 
penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with 
an object."25 
After being held in custody overnight, a Justice of the 
Peace convicted both men, who exercised their right to a trial 
de novo in Harris County, Texas Criminal Court. 26 The men 
entered pleas of nolo contendere to the charges of violating the 
anti-gay sodomy statute, but challenged this statute under the 
United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution Equal 
Protection clauses. 27 The Harris County Texas Criminal Court 
rejected challenges to the Texas anti-gay sodomy statute under 
the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution 
Equal Protection clauses. 28 The Harris County Court fined the 
men $200/9 and the men appealed to the Texas Court of Ap-
peals.30 
A. THE TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS 
The Texas Court of Appeals analyzed the Texas anti-gay 
sodomy statute utilizing equal protection and privacy analy-
ses.31 The Court of Appeals applied not only the United States 
Constitution but also equal protection and equal rights provi-
sions of the Texas Constitution. 32 Under all analyses, the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Harris County trial 
court.33 In analyzing the Texas constitutional provisions, the 
Court of Appeals conceded that the Texas and federal equal 
protection provisions shared common aims and goals resulting 
in the Texas cases often following federal precedent while in-
terpreting the Texas Equal Protection provision. 34 However, 
the Court of Appeals also recognized that the Texas Equal 
25 TEx PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01 (Vernon 2004). 
26 539 U.S. at 563. 
Z7 41 S.W. 3d at 350. Under the Texas Constitution, Justice of the Peace Courts 
have original jurisdiction in misdemeanor cases. TEX. CONST. art V, § 19. In a trial de 
novo, a matter is tried as if it had never been tried before. BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY, 
1544 (8th ed. 1999). The defendants' failed to challenge the propriety of the police con-
duct leading to their arrests or the facts surrounding those arrests. 41 S.W. at 350. 
28 539 U.S. at 563. 
29 [d. 
30 41 S.W. 3d at 350. 
31 [d. at 350-62. 
32 [d. at 350-59; U.S. CONST., amend. XN, § 1; TEX. CONST., art. I, §§ 3, 3(a). 
33 [d. at 362 . 
.. [d. at 359, 362. 
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Rights Amendment possessed no federal equivalent.35 Never-
theless, even utilizing the Texas Equal Rights Amendment, 
intended to provide greater protection than the United States 
Constitution, the Court of Appeals failed to strike down the 
Texas anti-gay sodomy statute. 36 
The Court of Appeals found that the anti-gay sodomy stat-
ute failed to distinguish persons by sexual orientation because 
even a heterosexual individual would be prosecuted if that per-
son performed a sex act with a person of the same sex.37 As a 
result, the statute existed as a facially neutral statute.S6 The 
Court of Appeals recognized that facially neutral statutes could 
still support an equal protection challenge where the statute 
was motivated by discriminatory animus.3' The Court of Ap-
peals implied that such animus might exist in Texas because 
the Texas Legislature repealed a similar prohibition against 
heterosexual sodomy .. o Even so, the Court of Appeals refused 
to acknowledge an equal protection violation because sexual 
orientation failed to rise to a suspect class, and, therefore, a 
focused prohibition against homosexual sodomy withstood chal-
lenge where such a prohibition was rationally related to a le-
gitimate state interest such as the protection of public morals!1 
The Court of Appeals also rejected an argument that the 
Anti-gay sodomy statute served as gender discrimination be-
cause the prohibition applied both to men having sex with men 
and women having sex with women!2· In addition, the Court of 
Appeals utilized federal and state zone-of-privacy analyses!a 
Under both federal and state constitutional law, the Court of 
Appeals rejected such zone-of-privacy analyses because the 
Court of Appeals found that homosexual conduct failed to con-
stitute a right "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty . 
deeply rooted in American history and tradition.'"" 
19). 
36 Id. at 352. 
38 Id. 
37 Id. at 353. 
38 Id. 
so Id. 
40 See id . 
• 1 Id. at 353-54. 
42 Id. at 357-58. 
43 Id. at 359-62 (citing U.S. CONST., amend. §§ 1, 3, 4, 5, 9.; TEX. CONST., art. I, § 
.. Id. at 361. 
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B. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: MAJORITY AND 
CONCURRENCE 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment 
of the Texas Court of Appeals.'5 In doing so, the United States 
Supreme Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, (hereinafter, 
Bowers) which held that no fundamental right existed to en-
gage in homosexual sexual conduct and morality provided a 
rational basis for a criminal proscription against gay, or for 
that matter, any consensual act of sodomy:6 In Lawrence, the 
United States Supreme Court, avoiding a fundamental-rights 
analysis, utilized a substantive-due-process privacy doctrine 
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to ana-
lyze whether the Texas anti-gay sodomy statute withstood con-
stitutional challenge." The Supreme Court in Lawrence util-
ized a rational-basis review finding, "[t]he Texas Statute fur-
thers no legitimate state interest which can justify its invasion 
into the personal and private life of the individual. "48 The Law-
rence Court traced the evolution of the right of consensual sex-
ual privacy from the narrowly protected space of the marital 
bedroom to the more broadly conceived right of unmarried 
teenagers to utilize contraceptive devices" to the right to obtain 
an abortion,50 utilizing Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, Roe v. Wade, Carey v. Population Services International, 
and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Ca-
sey.51 
.. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) . 
.. [d. at 578; 478 U.S. 186 (1986) . 
• 7 539 U.S. at 565 . 
.. [d. at 578 . 
•• [d. at 564-66. 
50 See [d. at 573 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. u. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992) (modified the applicable test set out in Roe determining when a state 
can restrict a woman's right to an abortion-moving from a trimester test to an undue 
burden test). 
6. [d. at 564-66, 573 (citing Griswold u. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(right of 
married persons to use contraceptives); Eisenstadt u. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)(right 
of single persons to obtain contraceptives); Roe u. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(right to 
obtain an abortion); Carey u. Population Seruices [nt'l, 431 U.S. 678 
(1977)(contraceptive devices to minors over 16); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pa. u. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)(modified the applicable test set out in Roe determin-
ing when a state can restrict a woman's right to have an abortion-moving from a 
trimester test to an undue burden test)). 
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The Lawrence Court recognized the constitutionality of the 
anti-gay sodomy ban in Bowers as inconsistent with the sub-
stantive-due-process privacy doctrine. 52 The Lawrence Court 
noted that the anti-gay sodomy law in Bowers and in Lawrence 
prohibited more than a particular sex act."a The Georgia law 
upheld in Bowers and the Texas law challenged in Lawrence 
touched "upon the most private human conduct, sexual behav-
ior, and in the most private of places ... to seek to control a 
personal relationship that ... is within the liberty of persons to 
choose .... "54 In Lawrence, the United States Supreme Court 
held that adult gays and lesbians possess the right to engage in 
consensual, private noncommercial sex acts. 55 Though the Law-
rence Court majority opted to utilize a broader and more pro-
tective substantive-due-process analysis instead of a narrower, 
less protective equal protection analysis,56 Justice O'Connor 
concurred with the majority's result"7 utilizing an equal protec-
tion analysis and finding, "[m]oral disapproval of this group, 
like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is in-
sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause."58 
C. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT 
Justice Scalia dissented:9 Justice Scalia, skeptical of the 
majority's analysis, criticized the majority's use of substantive-
due-process fundamental-rights cases in analyzing the Texas 
Anti-Gay sodomy statute.60 For Justice Scalia, Bowers re-
mained good doctrine and good thinking.61 In fact, Justice 
Scalia criticized the Lawrence majority for not properly utiliz-
52 [d. at 564-78. 
53 [d. at 567. 
54 [d. at 567. 
55 [d. at 578. 
56 [d. at 574-75. 
57 [d. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring) . 
.. [d. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
59 [d. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally, Daniel Gordon, Moralism, and 
the Fear of Social Chaos: The Dissent in Lawrence and the Antidotes of Vermont and 
Brown, 9 TEX. J. ON C. L. & C. R. 1 (2003). 
60 [d. at 594-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
61 [d. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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ing Bowers in the Lawrence analysis. 62 Justice Scalia noted, 
"[n]ot once does it describe homosexual sodomy as a 'fundamen-
tal right' or 'fundamental liberty interest."'63 Justice Scalia 
noted that substantive due process implicated heightened scru-
tiny for fundamental interests and rights only, which included 
rights deeply rooted in American history and tradition.64 Nei-
ther homosexual nor heterosexual sodomy qualified as deeply 
held social liberty norms in American social and legal history.65 
In addition, Justice Scalia criticized the Lawrence majority, 
finding that no rational basis existed to support the Texas anti-
gay sodomy statute.66 For Justice Scalia, sexual morality 
served as a rational basis for the statute.67 Justice Scalia ac-
cused the Lawrence majority of effectively decreeing the end of 
all morals legislation.68 Justice Scalia predicted that the major-
ity opinion's attack on sexuality created a slippery slope that 
would result logically in a subsequent Supreme Court majority 
recognizing a liberty interest in gay marriage.69 
Lawrence provided to gays and lesbians in the United 
States the freedom and security to be sexual without fear of 
criminal retribution. The Texas Court of Appeals opinion and 
Justice Scalia's dissent, however, reflected a residual and lin-
gering animus toward gay and lesbian Americans.70 This ani-
mus reflects a broader abject role played by gays and lesbians 
in the United States. The next section exposes the animus em-
bedded in the Texas Court of Appeal's opinion and Justice 
Scalia's dissent. 
II. THE ANIMUS EMBEDDED IN THE TEXAS COURT OF APPEAL'S 
OPINION AND JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT 
In defending the right and constitutional authority of the 
citizens of Texas and their legislature to punish gays and lesbi-
62 See id. at 594-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Bowers held, first that criminal pro-
hibitions of homosexual sodomy are not subject to heightened scrutiny[.J The Court 
today does not overrule this holding."). 
63 [d. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
54 [d. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
GO [d. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
GO [d. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
67 See id. at 599, 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
58 [d. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
69 [d. at 604-5. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
70 See infra notes 71-101 and accompanying text. 
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ans for sexual intimacy, Justice Scalia attempted to communi-
cate a neutral attitude toward gays and lesbians. Justice 
Scalia began a sentence by writing that he had nothing against 
homosexuals.71 He failed, however, to end his sentence with 
those words. The complete sentence read, "Let me be clear that 
I have nothing against homosexuals . . . promoting their 
agenda through normal democratic means.''''' Shortly before 
making this statement, Justice Scalia had already expressed 
concern about a homosexual agenda promoted by homosexual 
activists "directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that 
has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct."73 Justice 
Scalia also referred to gay and lesbian civil rights not as a legal 
movement but as part of a culture war in which the Lawrence 
majority had taken sides." Justice Scalia criticized the Law-
rence majority for the American mainstream's legal right to 
discriminate against gays and lesbians.75 In addition, Justice 
Scalia derided the anti-anti-homosexual culture of the Ameri-
can legal profession:6 
For Justice Scalia, animus towards gay and lesbian Ameri-
cans exhibited itself in the popular consciousness of the Ameri-
can mainstream. Many Americans in mainstream America "do 
not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as 
partners in their business[sic], as scoutmasters for their chil-
dren, as teachers in their children's schools, or as boarders in 
their home.''''" He relied on the democratic majority to protect 
America's families from a so-called homosexual lifestyle that 
the mainstream believed to be immoral and destructive.7s Jus-
tice Scalia utilized the will of the majority in the democratic 
process to justify segregating gays and lesbians from so-called 
normal, mainstream American life.79 The Texas Court of Ap-
71 539 u.s. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Tl [d. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
73 See id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(describing the majority's decision as the 
product of a legal profession that has "signed on to the homosexual agenda."). 
74 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
" [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What Texas has chosen to do is well within the 
range of traditional democratic action, and its hand should not be stayed through the 
invention of a brand-new 'constitutional right' by a Court that is impatient with democ-
ratic change."). 
76 [d. at 602-3 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
77 [d. 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
78 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
79 [d. at 602-3 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
9
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peals in Lawrence also utilized popular democracy reflected in 
legislative determination and action as a shield against legaliz-
ing gay and lesbian sexuality.80 The Texas Court of Appeals 
noted that the Texas Legislature lacked infallibility but re-
mained the sole constitutionally empowered entity to decide 
what constituted evil in the context of law.8' According to the 
Texas Court of Appeals, the Texas Legislature possessed the 
power to conclude that gay sodomy constituted deviant sexual-
ity while heterosexual sodomy failed to do SO.82 The Texas Court 
of Appeals wrote, "the court is not expected to make or change 
the law, but to construe it, and determine the power the legis-
lature had to pass such a law; whether that power was wisely 
or unwisely exercised, can be of no consequence. "83 
Justice Scalia and the Texas Court of Appeals respected in 
an unquestioning way the public animus of the popular major-
ity toward gays and lesbians. From the viewpoints of Justice 
Scalia and the Texas Court of Appeals, the Texas public found 
sound support for a segregationist dislike of gays and lesbians 
in tradition. 84 Contemporary lifestyles reflected long historical 
trends, and the Texas Court of Appeals described how Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam condemned gay sexual acts85 as did 
Roman Law, Blackstone, the Goths, and Montesquieu.86 Justice 
Scalia more generally noted that historically four executions 
occurred during the American colonial period as a result of sod-
omy convictions and that a couple of hundred people faced 
prosecution for consensual homosexual sodomy between 1880 
80 See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W. 3d 349, 362 & n.39 (Tex. App. 2001) rev'd, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003). 
81 [d. at 362. 
82 [d. at 356. 
83 [d. at 362 (citing People v. Griffin, 1 Idaho 476, 479 (1873)) . 
.. [d. at 362; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
85 [d. at 361, n.34. 
85 [d. at 361. Roman Law is [tjhe legal system of the ancient Romans, forming 
the basis of the modern civil law. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 1355 (8th ed. 1999). Sir 
William Blackstone served as a legal commentator in the Eighteenth Century in Eng-
land. DAVID A. LoCKMILLER, Sm WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, VII-VIII, 1 (Peter Smith 1970). 
Charles Louis de Secondat Montesquieu served as a French Enlightenment philoso-
pher in the Eighteenth Century. VOL. 19 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA INT'L ED, 
MONTESQUIEU, 410 (2003). The Goths were peoples who attacked the Roman Empire 
in the 3'" Century. VOL. 1 MARK KISHLANSKY, PATRICK GREARY, PATRICIA O'BRIEN, 
CMLIZATION IN THE WEST 177-78 (3d ed. 1998). 
10
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and 1995.87 Justice Scalia noted a moral opprobrium that has 
traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.88 
A long history of moral objection supported contemporary 
discrimination against gays and lesbians who threatened the 
American mainstream with their so-called lifestyle, according 
to Justice Scalia and the Texas Court of Appeals.8s Justice 
Scalia and the Texas Court of Appeals equated gay and lesbian 
consensual sexual intimacy with repulsive and harmful im-
moral acts."o The Texas Court of Appeals implied that gay 
sexuality constituted an evil lumped together with child por-
nography, adultery, bigamy, and marijuana use in addition to 
seduction, fornication, and bestiality."! Justice Scalia made a 
similar implicit connection with repulsive and immoral acts 
including fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, 
and obscenity.s2 
Justice Scalia and the Texas Court of Appeals armed 
themselves with strong societal justifications for defending a 
system that traditionally, socially segregated gays and lesbi-
ans, who engaged in so-called open sexual activity. Subtly and 
implicitly, Justice Scalia and the Texas Court of Appeals 
viewed gays and lesbians as threatening the security, safety, 
and basic structure of American society. Justice Scalia as-
serted that American society had relied on the doctrine of Bow-
ers v. Hardwick finding no fundamental right to engage in gay 
sexual activity."" Bowers allowed for the prohibition of a variety 
of immoral activities including gay and lesbian sexual inti-
macy."' Justice Scalia utilized, as examples of such societal re-
liance, restrictions on gays serving in the armed forces, dis-
charge of bisexuals from the armed forces, subjecting gays and 
lesbians seeking secret and top secret security clearance to 
more extensive background checks by the United States De-
fense Department, and allowing a police department to ask job 
87 539 U.S. at 597 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
88 [d. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
89 See 41 S.W. 3d at 361; see also 539 U.S. at 602-3 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
90 See 41 S.W. 3d at 362 & n.39. 
9! See id. at 362. & n.38. 
92 539 U.S. at 590, 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
93 539 U.S. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-
191, 196 (1986). 
94 539 U.S. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
11
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applicants about homosexual activity.95 The Texas Court of 
Appeals wrote about the threat of gays and lesbians in a more 
subtle fashion. When demonstrating the limits of a zone of pri-
vacy under the Texas Constitution, the Texas Court of Appeals 
utilized a case involving the promotion of a police officer who 
engaged in an adulterous affair with another police officer's 
spouse.96 While demonstrating the state's power to preserve 
and protect morality, the Court of Appeals pointed to, inter 
alia, requiring medical care for children, child endangerment, 
and the regulation of nude dancing in places where liquor is 
sold.97 Justice Scalia essentially equated gay and lesbian sexu-
ality with threats to national security and public safety, while 
the Texas Court of Appeals more subtly implicated public 
safety, the protection of children, and potentially harmful sub-
stances such as liquor in analyzing whether Texas could crimi-
nalize gay and lesbian sexuality:a 
III. MODELS FOR EXPLAINING ANIMUS 
Justice Scalia in his dissent in Lawrence and the Texas 
Court of Appeals in its opinion in Lawrence posited a social-
legal model that held American gays and lesbians in very low 
esteem among the so-called American mainstream majority. 
Justice Scalia's dissent and the Texas Court of Appeal's views 
of gays and lesbians evidenced a widespread, deep, and endur-
.. Id. at 590 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)(statute pro-
viding that member of the armed forces will be separated from services for engaging in 
homosexual relations); Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 483, 490 (9th Cir. 
2001)(upheld discharge of Navy civil engineer who was discharged for being bisexual); 
High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,570-571 
(9th Cir. 1990)(Department of Defense's practice of subjecting homosexual applicants to 
an expanded background check before issuing secret and top secret security clearances 
was not a violation of these applicants equal protection rights under the 5th amend-
ment. The Department of Defense's practice was rationally related to its legitimate 
concern that homosexuals are a group targeted by counterintelligence agencies, and 
thus the expanded investigations were needed to ensure that these applicants would 
not be susceptible to coercion or blackmail); Walls u. Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (relying on Bowers v. Hardwick the court held that a police department did 
not violate an applicant's right to privacy by asking about applicant's homosexual rela-
tions) . 
.. 41 S.W. 3d at 360. 
97 Id. at 354 . 
.. See id; 359 U.S. at 590 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting other instances of 
conduct that has been banned based on moral objections). 
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ing animus toward gays and lesbians.99 What is remarkable is 
that almost sixty years after the beginning of the modern indi-
vidual rights revolution beginning with the religious freedom 
cases'OO and fifty years after the fall of de jure racial segrega-
tion/o l a Justice of the United States Supreme Court and a 
state court of appeals justify a legal model that segregates so-
cially and stigmatizes criminally a segment of Americans be-
cause those Americans seek sexual and social intimacy. Two 
partial explanations exist for the enduring nature of the segre-
gationist social model posited in the Lawrence dissent and ma-
jority opinion in the Texas Court of Appeal's decision in Law-
rence-gays and lesbians as symptoms and the tensions of ur-
banization. 
A. GAYS AND LESBIANS AS SYMPrOMS 
Matti Bunzl in Symptoms of Modernity: Jews and Queers 
in Late Twentieth Century Vienna, Martin Riesebrodt in Pious 
Passion, the Emergence of Modern Fundamentalism in the 
United States and Iran, and Harvey Cox in The Secular City, 
Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective 
provide some conceptual bases for understanding why gays and 
lesbians even in modern, individual rights sensitized America 
remain socially very unpopular among many Americans includ-
ing Supreme Court justices and state appeals court judges. 102 
Matti Bunzl traced the roles of Jews, gays, and lesbians in 
Austrian society after the Second World War until the begin-
ning of the new century.103 Bunzl recognized that Jews, gays, 
99 See supra notes 71-98 and accompanying text. 
100 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,3,18 (1947)(upheld a New Jersey 
statute that reimbursed parents for the cost of bus transportation to parochial schools) 
and Illinois ex rei. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948)(held that a 
school program that released pupils from their legal duty to attend school for secular 
education on the condition that they attend religious classes violated the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). 
101 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954)(held that segregation 
of children in public schools solely on the basis of race denied minority children of equal 
educational opportunities). 
102 BUNZL, supra note 1; MARTIN RIESEBRODT, PIous PASSION, THE EMERGENCE 
OF MODERN FuNDAMENTALISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN, (1993); HARVEY Cox, 
THE SECULAR CITY, SECULARIZATION AND URBANIZATION IN THEOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE, (1966). 
103 BUNZL, supra note 1, at 23-24. 
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and lesbians differed markedly as social groupS.'04 Jews pos-
sessed a traditional theology while gays and lesbians remained 
a group constructed on the basis of sexual orientation. 105 How-
ever, Bunzl also identified strong social structural similarities 
between the groups in the context of modern Austrian society 
and Central Europe generally. 106 Bunzl wrote, "Jews and 
queers not only occupy analogous positions as victims of Nazi 
persecution and oppressed minorities ... [e]ven more impor-
tantly . . . they share a common genealogy of cultural abjec-
tion .... "'07 
Bunzl described how after the Second World War, Austria 
developed for itself a victim myth in which Austria avoided en-
visioning itself as participating in the Nazi war atrocities; in-
stead, Austria envisioned itself as the first invaded victim of 
Hitler's war machine in 1938.'08 This Austrian victim myth re-
quired that all Austrians, Jews, gays, and lesbians alike, be-
come equalized in their suffering during the Second World War 
even if factually the equality failed to exist. 109 For Jews, this 
meant that they were socially and legally required to deny the 
suffering that they experienced in the Holocaust. 110 The legal 
requirement of self-denial emerged through the resistance of 
the Austrian state to reparatory compensation of Jewish vic-
tims of the Holocaust. lll For decades after the Second World 
War, Jews became abject others in Austrian society facing con-
tinuing anti-semitism even after the experience of the Holo-
caust."' 
Bunzl also characterized Austria's gays and lesbians as an 
abject excluded group from Austrian society during the decades 
after the Second World War."3 Like Austrian Jews, Austrian 
gays also faced persecution by the Nazis during the Second 
World War, including imprisonment and death in concentra-
tion camps."' The Austrian victim myth that equalized all Aus-
104 Id. at 12. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
lOS Id. at 30-35. 
109 Id. 
uo Id. at 29-56. 
III Id. at 36. 
112 Id. at 30,44-49 
113 Id. at 60. 
114 Id. at 22. 
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trians as victims of Nazi persecution even those Austrians who 
actively supported the Nazis applied to gays and lesbians.1I5 
Like Jews, gays and lesbians faced resistance by the Austrian 
state to claims of reparatory compensation for suffering caused 
by the Nazis.1I6 In fact, gays and lesbians in Austria faced con-
tinued persecution even after the end of Nazi rule.1I7 Bunzl 
noted, "the structures of exclusion remained in place. Much as 
during the Third Reich, Austria's postwar community was 
imagined in constitutive opposition to a homosexual Other.ml8 
Gays and lesbians faced prosecution and imprisonment for 
sexual intimacy in the years following the Second World War,1I9 
and even when in 1971, the legal ban on gay and lesbian sexu-
ality ceased to exist; gays and lesbians faced prosecution for 
organizing or advocating gay and lesbian social positions.12o 
Overall, gays and lesbians hid privately in Austrian society in 
the decades following the Second World War.l2l 
Bunzl shared very negative stories about Jews, gays, and 
lesbians in Austria in the decades following the Second World 
War. 122 In contrast, he painted a much brighter picture for 
Jews, gays, and lesbians in Austria at the turn of the Twenty-
First Century.123 A post-Second World War generation of Jews 
asserted itself politically and socially in the 1970s/24 and the 
Austrian State, specifically the City of Vienna, recognized the 
Jewish community as a valuable component of Austrian soci-
ety.i25 The Austrian government finally recognized the particu-
larized suffering of the Jewish community during the Holo-
caust. 12• Post-Second World War generations of gays and lesbi-
ans also asserted themselves politically and socially beginning 
in the 1970s/27 and the City of Vienna included gays and lesbi-
115 Id. at 30-32, 61. 
116 Id. at 61. 
117 Id. at 61-64. 
118 Id. at 60. 
119 Id. at 62. 
120 Id. at 68. 
121 Id. at 73-81. 
122 Id. at 29-85. 
123 Id. at 155-211. 
124 Id. at 23-24, 91-116. 
125 Id. at 155-86. 
126 Id. at 173-76. 
127 Id. at 11 7-51. 
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ans as valued members of the Viennese community.'28 The 
roles of both communities in Austrian society positively 
evolved, and Bunzl identified a specific social dynamic that 
controlled the perceptions of Austrian society of Jews and gays, 
negative and positive.'29 
Bunzl developed a theory for why Jews, gays, and lesbians 
served as abject others in not only Austrian but also in Central 
European society generally.'30 Bunzl posited that Jews, gays, 
and lesbians served as "symptoms" in the classic sense of that 
word, subjective evidence of disease or physical disturbance.'3' 
In a more general, non-medical sense, Bunzl also utilized the 
word "symptoms" to describe the condition of post-World War 
II Jews, gays, and lesbians as evidence of a phenomenon. For 
Bunzl, symptom included dysfunction and sign.'32 Bunzl envi-
sioned Jews, gays, and lesbians as symptoms of nationalism. '33 
Jews, gays, and lesbians served as social signifiers demarcating 
the symbolic space of the nation,'34 which by its very nature ex-
isted as "imagined modem collectivities as ethnically homoge-
neous and inherently masculinist ... .'''35 
Jews, gays, and lesbians safeguarded a nation's socially 
imagined boundaries by serving as symbols of what a nation is 
not. '3S A nation remained characterized as ethnically homoge-
nous and sexually pure. '37 A nation became constructed on an 
ideology of manliness, and Jews, gays, and lesbians challenged 
that imagined national image.'38 Bunzl wrote, "[i]n the late 
nineteenth century, Jews and homosexuals had emerged in 
their modern configurations as the constitutive Others of an 
imagined space of ethnic and sexual homogeneity.m39 Jews, 
gays, and lesbians shared a set of stereotypes that included 
"effeminacy, sexual perversion, reproductive dysfunction, 
128 Id. at 187-211. 
129 Id. at 12-18. 
130 Id. at 12-13. 
131 Id. at 16; WEBSTER'S TlllRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2318 (Philip 
Babcock Gove, Ph.D ed., 1993). 
132 BUNZL, supra note 1, at 16. 
133 Id. at 13. 
134 Id. at 16. 
135 Id. at 13. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 15. 
136 Id. 
139 Id. at 217. 
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physical deformation - that located Jews and homosexuals in 
common opposition to the fiction of nationness.""o Under 
Bunzl's construct of the modern nation, these stereotypes de-
marcated the space beyond the edge of the symbolic space of 
the modern state.'4l 
B. THE TENSIONS OF URBANIZATION 
Bunzl anchored animus toward gays and lesbians in the 
homogenizing and masculinist natures of the modern nation. 
Other aspects of modernity also have an impact on Bunzl's 
"symptoms ofmodernity.",·2 Another component of modernity is 
urbanization. Bunzl implied as much by centering his anthro-
pological, ethnic, and intellectual enterprise in a city, Vienna.143 
A more direct view of the nature of urbanization helps one to 
understand the animus directed in modern America by many 
Americans, possibly even Justice Scalia's so-called mainstream 
majority, toward gays and lesbians. Harvey Cox defined the 
nature of modern urbanization in his examination of the nature 
of contemporary secularization ... • Cox envisioned urbanization 
as implicating the disintegration of tradition and diversity."5 
Specifically, the modern metropolis cast its inhabitants into an 
anonymous and mobile environment where people peeled away 
from their traditional social identities. Urban dwellers lived in 
a faceless and depersonalized space."· Cox noted that personal 
contact in the city tended to be "impersonal, superficial, transi-
tory and segmental."''' Urbanization could be seen as cold and 
heartless. 146 The city existed as pragmatic space where the 
worldview is directed toward the practical aspects of the world, 
as they exist day-to-day.149 
For Martin Riesebrodt, the space of the impersonal, prag-
matic, and mobile city created the fertile ground for a funda-
mentalist mobilization against the decay of the traditional pa-
,40 [d. at 15. 
,., [d. at 16. 
H2 [d. 
,43 [d. at 2. 
, .. COX, supra note 102. 
I'" [d. at 4. 
146 [d at 33. 
,47 [d. at 36. 
,48 [d. at 37. 
14. [d. at 52. 
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triarchal family.150 Like Cox, Riesebrodt focused on the deper-
sonalized character of the city. 151 Riesebrodt identified the de-
personalizing social organization of the city as threatening the 
personalistic-patriarchal nature of traditional religion and 
community. 15' Traditional sex roles constituted an important 
aspect of the personalistic-patriarchal system. 153 While describ-
ing the breakdown of the patriarchal-paternalistic culture of 
the bazaar in Teheran, Riesebrodt noted, "a profound break 
with traditional ideas ... all demonstrated to the bazaar milieu 
that it had lost its previous function as a cultural model.»i54 
Sexual morality and the relationship between the sexes repre-
sented a major challenge to patriarchal order.155 
As a result of the depersonalization processes of the city, 
the traditional patriarchy suffered a considerable loss of pres-
tige. 156 Mobility and anonymity in the city cheapened the value 
of traditional social roles and prestige as newcomers to the city 
failed to recognize the social and political achievement of those 
traditionally in power, the patriarchy. 157 In the anonymous, 
impersonal, and atomized environment of urbanization, con-
stant social change remained a logical result. Those who tradi-
tionally held power logically needed to share power and pres-
tige with a lot of other types of people in the pluralistic city. 
Cox noted "that a degree of tolerance and anonymity replace 
traditional moral sanctions and long-term acquaintance-
ships.»i58 According to Riesebrodt, the forces of tradition re-
belled against the natural social disintegration of traditional 
social structures in the city through the rise of fundamentalist 
movements.15' This reaction against a loss of social prestige 
among the traditional patriarchy threatened gays. While de-
scribing the results of the fundamentalist revolution in Tehe-
ran in the early 1980's, Riesebrodt noted, "[a]mong the first to 
suffer retaliation following the mullahs' seizure of power, be-
150 RIESE BRODT, supra note 102, at 83, 86. 
101 [d. at 168-69 . 
• 02 [d. at 168-70. 
153 [d. at 145-46 . 
• 54 [d. at 167. 
1M [d. at 173-74 . 
• 56 [d. at 167-69 . 
• 07 [d. at 95-7. 
158 Cox, supra note 102, at 4 . 
... RIESEBRODT, supra note 102, at 94. 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol35/iss2/1
2005] SCALIA AND TEXAS 129 
sides political enemies and religious minorities, were ... homo-
sexuals. Many of them were brought to trial, and not a few 
executed. 11160 
Bunzl, Cox, and Riesebrodt provided pieces of a model in 
which gays and lesbians faced threats from the stresses of 
modern social development. 161 Animus towards gays and lesbi-
ans is a modern and modernizing phenomenon. Bunzl implied 
such when he wrote, "[i]n early modern times, Jews did not 
have a privileged position vis-a-vis the body politic, while ho-
mosexuals had not existed as distinct species. m62 The dissent in 
Lawrence and the majority opinion of the Texas Court of Ap-
peals in Lawrence cast gays and lesbians in the role of symp-
toms of modernity, including nationalism and urbanization.163 
IV. EXPLAINING THE ANIMUS TOWARD GAYS AND LESBIANS 
Bunzl's social model in which gays and lesbians served as 
symptoms of modernity at least partially explains the animus 
toward gays and lesbians evidenced in Justice Scalia's dissent 
in Lawrence and in the Texas Court of Appeals majority opin-
ion. Gays and lesbians remained the abject others in both 
Scalia's dissent and the Court of Appeals opinion. Justice 
Scalia implied that gays and lesbians not only resided in social 
space outside the American mainstream, but that the private 
entities and government possessed the legal authority to dis-
criminate against gays and lesbians.lIl< In fact, Justice Scalia 
utilized quotation marks around the word "discriminate" when 
he discussed the Lawrence majority's concern about discrimina-
tion against gays. 165 The Texas Court of Appeals conceived of 
gay sexuality and sexual intimacy as beyond the realm of what 
constitutes public morals. The prohibition against gay sodomy 
became classified with the immoral when the Appeals Court 
noted, "the legislature has outlawed behavior ranging from 
murder to prostitution precisely because it has deemed these 
160 [d. at 128. 
161 See supra note 102. 
162 BUNZL, supra note I, at 16. 
163 See infra notes 164-209 and accompanying text. 
164 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603-4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
165 [d. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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activities to be immoral.m66 While discussing how gay sexuality 
remained traditionally outlawed, the Court of Appeals even 
referenced Blackstone's description of gay sexuality as an "in-
famous crime against nature. ",67 
Bunzl identified gays and lesbians as "constitutive Others" 
beyond the national norm,'58 just as Justice Scalia and the 
Texas Court of Appeals identified gays and lesbians beyond the 
American mainstream moral space. During the Second World 
War, the Nazis forced gays incarcerated in concentration camps 
to wear a pink triangle in the interest of sexual purification. 16" 
Justice Scalia and the Texas Court of Appeals directed scorn 
against America's gays and lesbians by classifying gay sexual-
ity as the traditional target of moral opprobrium.17o Bunzl also 
posited that the modern nation "depended on the foundational 
construction of constitutive outsides."171 Justice Scalia and the 
Texas Court of Appeals implied the nationalistic nature of the 
United States through an implicit contrast with gays and les-
bians as constitutive outsiders of American society. Justice 
Scalia starkly contrasted gays and gay activists with the 
American mainstream, and insinuated that gay activism is a 
form of culture war against the American mainstream.172 
Opposition to gay sexuality ran consistent with American 
majoritarianism. The Texas Court of Appeals emphasized that 
the Legislature "alone is constitutionally empowered to decide 
which evils it will restrain when enacting laws for the public 
good."173 This devotion to democratic principles in defending the 
Texas anti-gay sodomy statute indicated that the popular will 
of the citizenry opposed gay sexuality. Justice Scalia implicitly 
accused gay activists of imposing their views on the democratic 
majority.174 The democratic majority represented the essence 
166 Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W. 3d 349, 354 (Tex. App. 2001) rev'd, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
,.7 [d. at 36l. 
168 BUNZL, supra note 1, at 213-14. 
169 [d. at 22. 
170 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.558, 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 41 S.W. at 36l. 
171 BUNZL, supra note 1, at 13. 
172 See 539 U.S. at 602-3 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
173 41 S.W. 3d at 362. 
174 See 539 U.S. at 602-3 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia first accused the 
majority of being influenced by the homosexual agenda. [d. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). Subsequently, Justice Scalia stated that the majority had impatiently imposed its 
views on the people. [d. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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ofthe American social value system. As a result, Justice Scalia 
and the Texas Court of Appeals cast gays and lesbians beyond 
the outer boundaries of American social life; gays and lesbians 
functioned as negative social signifiers, giving coherence to 
American nationness, or at least the Texas majority's notion of 
American nationness. 175 
As the implicit, constitutive others to the American social 
norm in Justice Scalia's dissent and the Texas Court of Ap-
peal's opinion, gays and lesbians indirectly signified the true 
nature of American society. First and most obvious, America is 
a heterosexual nation. The Texas Court of Appeals implied as 
much in how it analyzed the equal protection issue in Law-
rence.176 In 1973, the Texas Legislature repealed the general 
sodomy prohibition. 177 The Legislature failed, however, to re-
peal the prohibition against gay sodomy.178 As a result, hetero-
sexual sodomy became lawful, while gay sodomy remained 
unlawful. 17. The Texas Court of Appeals found no equal protec-
tion problem when the Court of Appeals noted, "the legislature 
could have concluded that deviant sexual intercourse, when 
performed by members of the same sex, is an act different from 
or more offensive than any such conduct performed by mem-
bers of the opposite sex. m80 Justice Scalia in his dissent implied 
that the American mainstream remained heterosexual, and the 
gay activists trying to convince the democratic majority of the 
acceptability of gay sexuality had a long way to go to succeed in 
their efforts. 181 
In addition to being a heterosexual nation, the United 
States valued heterosexual family life and children born in het-
erosexual unions. Justice Scalia noted that such families and 
children felt threatened by active gay lifestyles. 182 Justice Scalia 
announced that Americans did not want gays to be scoutmas-
ters and teachers. 183 Americans wanted to bar gays from board-
17' BUNZL, supra note 1, at 16; 539 U.S. 602; 41 S.W. 3d at 354. 
176 See 41 S.W. 3d at 350-59. 
177 [d. at 353. 
178 [d. 
178 [d. 
1BO [d. at 356-57. 
181 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.558, 602-3 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
182 See id. at 602. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
183 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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ing in their homes. 18. Overall, Americans protect themselves 
and their families from the supposed destructiveness of gay 
lifestyles. 185 Furthermore, American business also desires pro-
tection from the gay lifestyle, as Americans want to avoid gay 
business partners who engage in gay lifestyles. 186 
Bunzl noted that nationalism by its very nature is a mas-
culinist enterprise. 187 Justice Scalia's view of the need to pro-
tect the American family and the protection of their children 
supports such a view of the American social space. A guardian 
needed to stand at the door of the American home, Justice 
Scalia implied that mainstream America needs a protective 
family patriarch. 188 This guardian is even needed for American 
business to protect itself against what Bunzl noted as the tra-
ditional notion of gay effeminacy.18' Justice Scalia's imagery 
reflected the masculine nature of the American nation. Justice 
Scalia asserted that the majority in Lawrence created a mas-
sive disruption in the social order by overruling Bowers. I' O 
With Bowers gone, the Lawrence majority threatened the legal 
precedent that protected the American military and the De-
fense Department in their exercise of discriminatory practices 
against gays and lesbians. I ' 1 Justice Scalia assumed that gays 
and lesbians threatened institutions that guarded America's 
security and strength. Justice Scalia implied that gays and 
lesbians threatened a muscular, manly aspect of the American 
184 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
186 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally, Daniel Gordon, Moralism, and the 
Fear of Social Chaos: The Dissent in Lawrence and the Antidotes of Vermont and 
Brown, 9 TEX. J. ON C. L. & C. R. 1 (2003). 
186 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
187 BUNZL, supra note 1, at 15-16 (discussing Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality). 
188 See 539 U.S. 602. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
189 BUNZL, supra note 1, at 15 (discussing Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality). 
190 539 U.S. at 591 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
191Id. at 590 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)(statute pro-
viding that member of the armed forces will be separated from services for engaging in 
homosexual relations); Sclwwengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 483, 490 (9th Cir. 
2001)(upheld discharge of Navy civil engineer who was discharged for being bisexual); 
High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 570-571 
(9th Cir. 1990)(Department of Defense's practice of subjecting homosexual applicants to 
an expanded background check before issuing secret and top secret security clearances 
was not a violation of these applicants equal protection rights under the 5th amend-
ment. The Department of Defense's practice was rationally related to its legitimate 
concern that homosexuals are a group targeted by counterintelligence agencies, and 
thus the expanded investigations were needed to ensure that these applicants would 
not be susceptible to coercion or blackmail). 
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social order, which assured that America would continue to 
survive even in the face of a determined enemy. 
Justice Scalia's nationalist project in Lawrence became 
clear in his approach to foreign law. The Lawrence majority 
relied on foreign law in deciding whether to overrule Bowers.192 
The Lawrence majority wrote, "it should be noted that the rea-
soning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. 
The European Court of Human Rights has followed not Bowers 
but its own decision.","3 Justice Scalia responded negatively to 
the majority's reliance on foreign law. 1"4 Justice Scalia re-
minded the majority that sodomy failed to be a right deeply 
rooted in American law, and that such a right would never 
spring into existence in America as a result of foreign laws de-
criminalizing sodomy.I"5 The norms of a wider civilization were 
irrelevant. For Scalia, foreign law remained meaningless and 
dangerous law.I"S The Texas Court of Appeals avoided discuss-
ing the value of foreign law. However, the Court of Appeals 
alluded to the narrowness of its legal, analytical enterprise by 
stating, "[o]ur concern ... cannot be with cultural trends and 
political movements because these can have no place in our 
decision without usurping the role of the Legislature.'''"7 As a 
result, the Court of Appeals cast doubt on whether it would 
consider foreign law in analyzing whether the Texas Legisla-
ture could prohibit gay sexual intimacy. 
Not only did dissent in Lawrence implicate American na-
tionalism but the also the effects of urbanization. The geo-
graphic context of Lawrence was Houston, Harris County, 
Texas,I"8 a major, cultured American city. John Lawrence and 
Tyron Garner, the arrestees in Lawrence, did not run afoul of a 
small town deputy sheriff who viewed gays as threatening to a 
small town's way of life; instead, they ran afoul of police in a 
sophisticated urban region of Houston.I" The anti-gay animus 
192 [d. at 572-73. 
193 [d. at 576. 
19< [d. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
195 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
196 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally Daniel Gordon, Gay Rights, Danger-
ous Foreign Law, and American Civil Procedure, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 685 (2005). 
197 Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W. 3d 349, 362 (Tex. App. 2001) rev'd, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
198 539 U.S. at 562. 
199 See DAVID G. MCCOMB, HOUSTON: A HISTORY at 182-186 (1981). 
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evidenced in Justice Scalia's dissent and the Texas Court of 
Appeals decision originated with a legal system in a sophisti-
cated urban environment. Lawrence implicated Harvey Cox's 
observations concerning the anonymous, impersonal, and mo-
bile nature of urbanization,2°O and Martin Riesebrodt's observa-
tions concerning the socially reactionary revolt against the 
anonymous and depersonalized nature of the city.201 Houston 
possesses a tradition of rapid urbanization.202 
Riesebrodt observed that rapid urbanization and change 
resulted in an enormous loss of prestige for traditionalists, 
even on a nationwide basis.203 Riesebrodt noted, "[t]he entirety 
of experiences of deprivation and of fears of social decline and 
disappointed hopes in upward social mobility in the context of 
rapid rise of other social groups is explained as the fruit of ... 
immorality."20< The Texas Court of Appeals in Lawrence 
evinced a social clash between homosexuals and heterosexu-
als.205 The Court of Appeals considered the Texas Legislature a 
protective shield against the onslaught of gays and the gay life-
style. The Legislature possessed the power to prefer hetero-
sexual sexuality to homosexual sexuality, and the Legislature 
utilized its power.206 Justice Scalia was more direct in identify-
ing a clash between a traditional group, heterosexuals, and a 
newcomer in a mobile urbanizing, even national context, 
gays.207 According to Justice Scalia, gay activists hijacked the 
American legal profession creating a pro-gay culture in the le-
gal profession,20B which, in turn, attempted to impose a gay 
agenda on the democratic majority.209 Justice Scalia and the 
Texas Court of Appeals protected the traditional heterosexual 
milieu in the Lawrence context, a rapidly urbanizing milieu in 
200 See supra notes 144-149 and accompanying text. 
201 See supra notes 150-160 and accompanying text. 
202 McCOMB, supra note 199, at 6-7. As one Houstonian described the situation, 
"'I think I'll like Houston if they ever get it finished'". [d. at 132. See also 1990 United 
States Census, Population and Housing Units, 1970 to 1990: Area Measurements and 
Density: 1990, Table 45, 477. 
203 RIESEBRODT, supra note 102, at 96-97,167 . 
... [d. at 198. 
2015 Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W. 3d 349, 356, 362 (Tex. App. 2001) rev'd, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003). 
206 [d. at 355-56. 
207 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
206 See id. at 602-3 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
209 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Houston, from the onslaught of the rising gay and lesbian 
communities led by their activists. 
Justice Scalia in Lawrence and Texas Court of Appeals 
opinion in Lawrence represented the utilization of gays and 
lesbians as symptoms of traditional American nationalism 
based on heterosexual homogeneity. American society pos-
sessed an outer limit. The heterosexual family and its children 
lived within the limits of that society. Gays and lesbians lived 
beyond these limits and helped to define America by represent-
ing what America was not, an effeminate nation unable to se-
cure itself against whatever enemies America might face. Jus-
tice Scalia and the Texas Court of Appeals sought to protect the 
status of heterosexuals as totally dominant in not only Houston 
but throughout Texas and America. 
v. CONCLUSION: A BRIGHTER FuTuRE-THE END OF ANIMUS 
Justice Scalia's dissent and the Texas Court of Appeal's 
opinion in Lawrence reflected a deep animus toward gay and 
lesbian Americans.210 Justice Scalia and the Texas Court of Ap-
peals implied that this deep animus directed toward gays and 
lesbians represented a mainstream, traditional, and majority 
view.211 This animus also served two social-space purposes in 
the American social system. First, this animus served as a 
symptom of American nationalism in which America became 
symbolized as a homogeneous, heterosexual, family-protective, 
masculine nation.212 Second, this animus served as a shield di-
rected against gay activism that threatened to downgrade the 
lofty status of heterosexual traditionalists.213 Though American 
gays may have won the right to experience sexual intimacy 
without the threat of criminal sanction in Lawrence,214 the ani-
mus directed toward gays in Justice Scalia's dissent and in the 
Texas Court of Appeal's opinion signaled the existence of a so-
cial undercurrent that continues to threaten the liberty inter-
ests and equality of gays and lesbians. The taint of social nega-
tivism reflected in the context of the Lawrence case may not be 
210 See supra notes 71·98 and accompanying text. 
2ll See supra notes 164-175 and accompanying text. 
212 See supra notes 176-197 and accompanying text. 
213 See supra notes 198-209 and accompanying text. 
214 539 U.S. at 578. 
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long-lived. The social status of gays and lesbians in America 
may improve a great deal in the decades ahead as a response to 
weakening nationalism in the face of globalization. 
Matti Bunzl not only chronicled the oppressive social cir-
cumstances of Jews, gays, and lesbians in Vienna during the 
second half of the Twentieth Century,215 but he also described 
how conditions improved markedly for Jews, gays, and lesbi-
ans.2!. The dynamic of social improvement occurred according 
to Bunzl "as communities were no longer imagined according to 
nationalism's formative principles, groups like Jews and queers 
. . . ceased to function as constitutive Others. m17 With the 
weakening of nationalist tendencies came a parallel weakening 
of symptomatic tendencies that resulted in animus.218 As na-
tionalism weakened, the symptoms of nationalism faded.219 
Bunzl posited Austria's entry into the European Community as 
the internationalizing and pluralizing political force that sig-
nificantly weakened Austrian nationalism, resulting in the so-
cial integration of Jews, gays, and lesbians into Austrian soci-
ety.2'O In the American context, globalization should perform 
some of the same defusing of American nationalism. Globaliza-
tion is a process that positively challenges nations, including 
the United States, to be socially open because globalization en-
courages a worldview beyond the nation, one open to pluralism. 
In the case of globalization, internationalizing and pluralizing 
economic forces are weakening nationalism, including Ameri-
can nationalism:'! In addition, Houston and other American 
cities will not continue to grow forever. Urbanization, one 
hopes, will level off and the stresses of urbanization, including 
anonymity, mobility, and the impersonal nature of the city, will 
be better tolerated in a more demographically stable environ-
ment. 
American gay rights cases certainly evidenced the legal-
cultural impact of globalization. The Lawrence majority relied 
on European Community and comparative law to analyze 
2LO See BUNZL, supra note 1, at 29-85. 
"6 Id. at 89-186. 
217 Id. at 216. 
218 Id. at 182-84. 
219 Id. at 216-17. 
220 Id. at 182-84. 
22! See THoMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE, UNDERSTANDING 
GLOBALIZATION 7-24,59-72 (1999). 
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whether to overrule Bowers and accord constitutional rights to 
gays and lesbians!22 In Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health, the Massachusetts case recognizing gay marriage as a 
right under the Massachusetts Constitution, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court relied more than once on Canadian law in 
its analyses!23 In Baker v. State of Vermont, the Vermont case 
recognizing gay civil unions as a right under the Vermont Con-
stitution, the Vermont Supreme Court referred to discussions 
about registered partnership acts in Denmark and Norway!2' It 
is hoped that these cases signal the weakening of American 
nationalism and the end of American gays and lesbians being 
exploited as abject others in order to define the homogeneous, 
heterosexual, and masculine nature of the American nation. 
222 539 u.s. at 572-73, 576-77. 
223 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N .E. 2d 941, 966 n.31, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
224 Baker v. State, 744 A. 2d 864, 867, 886-87 (Vt. 1999). 
27
Gordon: Scalia and Texas
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2005
